Micah Sherr. Testimony to the Maryland Joint Committee Hearing on Election Cybersecurity. House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Education, Health, and Environmental Affairs Committee, Maryland State Legislature, September 2017. Annapolis, MD. [ bib | .pdf ]

Andreas Haeberlen, Mingchen Zhao, Wenchao Zhou, Alexander Gurney, Micah Sherr, and Boon Thau Loo. Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Verification Protocols (Invited paper). In Workshop on Large-Scale Distributed Systems and Middleware (LADIS), July 2012. [ bib | .pdf ]

We outline our vision of large-scale distributed systems that efficiently combine privacy and verifiability. In the systems we envision, a group of nodes would be able to verify that a given node Ni has been executing a given algorithm A(Ni). If successful, the verification would not reveal any additional information.

Boon Thau Loo, Harjot Gill, Changbin Liu, Yun Mao, William R. Marczak, Micah Sherr, Anduo Wang, and Wenchao Zhou. Recent Advances in Declarative Networking (Invited paper). In International Symposium on Practical Aspects of Declarative Languages (PADL), 2012. [ bib | .pdf ]

Declarative networking is a programming methodology that enables developers to concisely specify network protocols and services, and directly compile these specifications into a dataflow framework for execution. This paper describes recent advances in declarative networking, tracing its evolution from a rapid prototyping framework towards a platform that serves as an important bridge connecting formal theories for reasoning about protocol correctness and actual implementations. In particular, the paper focuses on the use of declarative networking for addressing four main challenges in the distributed systems development cycle: the generation of safe routing implementations, debugging, security and privacy, and optimizing distributed systems.

Micah Sherr. Testimony to the West Virginia Joint Judiciary Subcommittee, August 2009. Charleston, WV. [ bib | .pdf ]

Micah Sherr. Coordinate-Based Routing for High Performance Anonymity. PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2009. [ bib | .pdf ]

Today's Internet routing protocols, while arguably robust and efficient, are not designed to support anonymous communication. Internet packets must include accurate destination addresses to be routable and truthful source information to achieve reliability. While there have been several attempts at providing anonymity with the use of application-level overlay networks, these solutions focus almost exclusively on maximizing anonymity, typically at the expense of performance.

This dissertation shows that it is both possible and practical to design, secure, and scale decentralized overlay networks for high performance anonymous routing. Our techniques utilize virtual coordinate systems that embed link information (for example, latency, jitter, and loss) in n-dimensional coordinate planes. Such coordinate systems enable nodes to estimate pairwise network metrics between remote peers without requiring direct measurements. We introduce methods for scalably disseminating coordinate information as well as security mechanisms for enforcing truthful coordinate advertisements. By allowing nodes to estimate the end-to-end performance of possible routes, our overlay routing infrastructure empowers applications to intelligently select high performing anonymous paths.

Unlike existing anonymity systems that depend on central authorities or directories, our coordinate routing system does not rely on a priori trusted nodes or third-party authorities. This lack of centralization enables our system to scale to potentially millions of nodes and offer anonymity that does not depend on the trustworthiness of select nodes or services. Moreover, the ability to estimate the end-to-end performance of potential anonymous paths and prune likely underperforming routes permits the anonymization of high bandwidth and low latency network services (for example, voice-over-IP, streaming video multicast, etc.) whose communication requirements have previously been considered too restrictive for anonymity networks.

Patrick McDaniel et al. EVEREST: Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards and Testing, December 2007. [ bib | .pdf ]

Matt Blaze, Arel Cordero, Sophie Engle, Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, Micah Sherr, Till Stegers, and Ka-Ping Yee. Source Code Review of the Sequoia Voting System, July 2007. Part of the California Secretary of State Top-to-Bottom Review of electronic voting machines. [ bib | .pdf ]

Madhukar Anand, Eric Cronin, Micah Sherr, Matt Blaze, and Sampath Kannan. Security protocols with isotropic channels. Technical Report TR-CIS-06-18, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, November 2006. [ bib | .pdf ]